This article appeared in the April 1993 issue of Code One Magazine.
With his first (ever) Mexican beer, Alexander Vsevolodovich Velovich washed down a plate of enchiladas, Spanish rice, and refried beans. The former
MIG designer was assaulting his palate before speaking to a group of
aviation enthusiasts gathered in the banquet room of a Mexican food
restaurant in Arlington, Texas. Scattered around the room were many
aerospace workers of his country’s former foe. (The United States, in
case anyone forgot.) Nonetheless, Velovich looked relaxed except for a
few beads of picante-induced sweat on his upper lip.
Velovich, who was in the United States promoting joint US-Russian projects, has a distinguished career. He joined the Mikoyan Design Bureau in 1978 after graduating from the Moscow Aviation Institute with a background in mechanical engineering, flight dynamics, and flight testing. One of his first assignments at the bureau was to program a mathematical model of the MIG-25’s air-to-air missiles.
He soon became involved in
the flight test program for the MIG-31 and then deeply involved in the
development program for the MIG-29. He rose quickly at the bureau,
achieving senior engineer status in 1980. Two years later, he became a
section chief. By 1987 he was the youngest department head at the
bureau. In 1988, as a branch manager, Velovich was responsible for
comparative analyses, combat efficiency assessment, onboard mission
computer algorithms, stores separation modeling, system and equipment
specifications, and flight test analyses. He also worked on the
fly-by-wire version of the MIG-29. When he left the MIG Design Bureau
in 1990 at the age of thirty-five, he was the bureau’s lead engineer
for special projects.
The day before his presentation in
Arlington, Code One’s Eric Hehs visited with Velovich for an exclusive
peek into the Soviet aircraft design system and for a Russian
perspective on the current state of the former union. Velovich now
works as the Moscow correspondent for the aviation weekly Flight
International. He is also the director of joint projects and co-owner
of AviaData – a Russian consulting agency specializing in aerospace and
defense projects. His relative youth belies his experience. His English
is perfect. And his laugh is what you’d expect from a stout Russian –
robust and loud.
Why did you leave the MIG Design Bureau?
I
felt that the bureau was not in good shape because of all the defense
cuts and economic reforms. I also wanted to be self-sufficient and not
depend so much on someone else for my success. As I climbed the company
ladder at Mikoyan, I became less satisfied with the type of work I was
doing. I was less involved in design. I had more administrative duties.
The
new environment in Russia encourages free enterprise and personal
initiative. I decided that I could have more satisfaction and make more
money by working on my own. With two of my friends, we started our own
company.
What is the situation for those who remain?
I
still have many friends working for Mikoyan. Three-fourths of them are
not satisfied with how things are going with the company right now.
There is not much work. Many programs have been terminated. Many still
there are trying to find things to do.
Russians can make
five or six times the money they would receive at the design bureau by
working in an automotive repair shop. The head of the company,
[Rostislav] Belyakov, recently complained in the Russian press that the
average salary at the bureau is now lower than what someone could make
selling cans of beer in the street. So, many of those who could find
work outside the company have left.
What effects has dissolution had on the various design bureaus?
The
breakup of the Soviet Union has not had any real influence on the
design process. But many programs have been terminated. Very few
development programs are still financed by the government. The biggest
effect is that there is no money to develop and design anything.
We
no longer have a Ministry of Aircraft Industry, which had a very
centralized power and control over the design bureaus and production
facilities. The design bureaus in theory are now more independent than
they were three years ago in making decisions and getting orders. The
money used to go to the ministry, which would distribute it among the
design bureaus. The ministry would sustain all the design bureaus even
though a particular one may not be performing very well. Now, without
this regulating system, research institutes and design bureaus have a
direct relationship with the air force. The lack of money, however, has
had a much more profound effect.
What are former defense workers doing?
An
aerodynamicist from TsAGI [Russia’s equivalent of NASA], who was
involved with computer modeling of propellers, is now a financier and
the president of an insurance group. He drives a Mercedes. His partners
bought a pair of Su-27s. I am here in the United States to promote this
group to American air shows.
You can find people with
technical backgrounds in new commercial enterprises. Many of these
people are graduates of Moscow Physical-Technical Institute, Moscow
Aviation Institute, and Moscow University’s computer department. At
least two-thirds of today’s entrepreneurs are former defense industry
workers or researchers.
What accounts for this high percentage?
Under
the previous system, the most talented people tried to find success in
the defense industry or science because these industries provided the
most probable chances of acquiring better positions in society. This
was prestigious work in a. privileged sector of the economy.
These
talented people were the first to recognize the new opportunities and
the first to move away from the former privileged sector to a more
promising sector. These people are more likely to recognize where
opportunity exists in a given economic system.
How would
you compare the effects of this fundamental restructuring of your
defense industry with the restructuring facing defense workers in the
United States?
For America the changes will not be as
drastic. You are already accustomed to the rise and fall that comes
with bad times and good times for defense industries. In the Soviet
Union, the work was always steady. We always enjoyed total employment
in our socialist system. We had a very stable environment, with nothing
to worry about. But if we wanted to change something, it was very
difficult to do. The new system is psychologically very different and
difficult for many people. The stability has vanished.
The
disposition of former Soviet nuclear scientists has been of some
concern in the West. Should we also be concerned about the fate of
Soviet aircraft designers?
I don’t think so. First, I
don’t think aircraft engineers are of similar value. One nuclear
reactor is much more militarily significant than the ability to produce
aircraft. But more importantly, the knowledge for both disciplines is
readily accessible. Third world nations like Iran, Iraq, and Libya can
get nuclear weapon technology from other third world countries.
Students from these countries can attend American universities and
learn aerospace engineering. There’s not much that any country can do
to prevent the transfer of technology.
Do you consider yourself a capitalist now?
I
prefer the word entrepreneur to capitalist, though I don’t see anything
bad with the second term. I feel that I am a capitalist because I am a
co-owner of my own company, which employs fourteen people. All of them
have the equivalent of a master’s degree in engineering sciences,
computer technology, or foreign languages. We are involved in a variety
of projects. We translate from Russian to English and from English to
Russian. As an example, Aviation Week and Space Technology publishes a
digest of its articles. Our company gets hard currency for translating
it into Russian.
We also put out a magazine for professional
musicians. Most of our employees like music. The publication, part
catalog, introduces musical equipment from the West to the Russian
market. It pays for itself in advertising.
We also have some
contracts with Western companies that are trying to introduce
themselves into Russian markets. We know many people in the Russian
aerospace industry. We bring people together. New airlines are forming
in the former Soviet Union and we are giving them advice on advertising.
My
experience as a system integration specialist gave me a wide variety of
contacts within Russian industry. I was also a member of the Soviet
delegation to international air shows where I worked as a translator.
This job acquainted me with people from other design bureaus and with
subcontractors. These associations help me as a consultant and as a
journalist for Flight International.
Getting back to your
original question, I never was a true communist. I was always a bit of
a social democrat. While both communist and capitalist systems have
their advantages and disadvantages, I now believe that a free market
economy and democracy can do more for people than a centralized economy
and a strict ideological society. And I held this view five years ago,
when it was not so popular.
But wasn’t membership in the
Communist Party required for a high position in any bureaucracy,
including the Mikoyan Design Bureau?
I joined the
party when I was being considered for promotion to deputy department
head. I was a section chief at the time. My branch manager invited me
to his office to talk about the promotion. In that conversation, he
asked what I thought about joining the Communist Party. I was prepared
for the question and did not hesitate in answering that I had nothing
against joining, which was a bit of a lie. At that time, my thinking
was to some extent different from the official ideology. To be
promoted, I joined. But this practice was universal. An average level
of management had to be members of the Communist Party.
I
left the Communist Party in June 1990, almost two months before
President Yeltsin did. I turned in my party membership card, stating
that I disagreed with the party’s policy for ethical and political
reasons. Afterwards, several people asked me if I was crazy. Many still
believed that dark times could return.
Were you a closet dissident?
I
was not a dissident. I was a free thinker, even as a teenager. While
that did not hinder my career, I often had to make compromises with my
conscience. For example, if I wanted to work in the defense industry or
graduate from the aviation institute, I had to be a member of the Young
Communist League.
My grandfather was shot by a firing squad
during the Stalinist purges. My father was always an anti-Stalinist and
he taught me that. I always knew our government had done terrible
things, and I always felt bad about it. When I was seventeen, I read
Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago. The book was outlawed at the time,
but you could get copies of it in intellectual circles in Moscow with
some amount of risk. This book influenced my way of thinking.
When
I was twelve or thirteen, one of my hobbies was DXing, shortwave radio.
I’d listen to broadcasts from around the world. In Russia, information
from the outside was always available; you just had to want access to
it.
In 1968, Russian and other Eastern European troops
invaded or entered, depending on your viewpoint, Czechoslovakia. That
was the first time I strongly disagreed with official government
policy. I was thirteen, and we discussed the event in class. I made the
mistake of arguing against the government’s action with a classmate
whose father was high in the KGB. That got my parents into a little
trouble.
How is it that the Soviets had or still have an edge over the West in some technical disciplines, for example, material science?
Because
we lag behind in computer technology and in communication and
information technology, our electronic systems are heavier and bulkier.
A designer has to overcome these deficiencies. That may help explain
why our material sciences may be more advanced. In general,
aerodynamics and structural analysis is less influenced by computer
technology than is avionics.
How advanced is your computer technology?
We
have computers but they are not as advanced as those in the West. Some
of our computers are made in Russia and the former East Germany. Many
of our PCs were manufactured in Southeast Asia.
Despite
Western controls on exports to Russia American computers often came
through third world nations. Usually there were ways to get around the
rules. I myself worked on American computers at the Mikoyan Design
Bureau. These controls were probably more harmful to American business
than they were to the Soviet Union.
Did fears of and restraints on communication hinder the development of your own computer technology?
No. We were just not clever enough to understand the significance of the computer revolution. [Laughs]
As
late as 1989 the MIG Design Bureau was closed and the doors were sealed
and guarded before great holidays –the first of May for international
solidarity of working people and the seventh of November for the
anniversary of the great October socialist revolution. We had orders to
clean our offices. All typewriters were collected in one room which was
locked and sealed. The key was placed in a known location. The
government was afraid that somebody would crawl into the room and use a
typewriter to produce leaflets calling for some civic disturbance. So
now you can understand why we didn’t adopt computer technology: It
would have been too much trouble to move hundreds of computers and
printers into that small room. [Laughs]
Seriously, the
answer has more to do with communist ideology. The ideology favors
material production over intellectual work. The working class is the
ruling class of the globe. Those who work with their hands are superior
to those who work with their minds. This concept was more fundamental
in delaying our acceptance and use of computer technology than any fear
of rapid and widespread communication.
The MIG-31 had the
first airborne phased-array radar with electronic scanning. The system
permits you to throw the radar beam from one sector to another without
having to mechanically move an antenna dish. Until your Advanced
Tactical Fighter, not a single American fighter had an active
phased-array radar with electronic scanning. Your first airborne
electronic scanning radar, the APQ-164, was on the B-1B. It appeared
about two or three years after the MIG-31 radar.
In his recent book, Fulcrum,
Alexander Zuyev, a top MIG-29 pilot who defected to the West,
documented that an American spy working at a Russian radar design and
manufacturing bureau for many years gave away Russian secrets to
America. I have not come across one mention of the possibility of
Americans copying Russian radar technology even though the
circumstances and timing seem to support this.
But I don’t
believe that your APQ-164 was a copy of ours. People on both sides of
the Atlantic work on common problems and come up with similar solutions.
When
we first came to America with the MIG-29 in 1990, I kept hearing and
reading that we copied the F-14 because Our aircraft looks like the
F-14. They also said that we copied the F-18 because the MIG-29 looks
like the F-18. Well, it’s true that all three aircraft have two fins
and two engines.
Fortunately, the F-16 has a single engine
and one fin, so I haven’t noticed anyone saying that we copied the
F-16. But the F-15, F-14, and F-18 have two engines and two fins, so we
copied each and all of them. I’ve read this in dozens of publications.
Well, from the front, the MIG-29 resembles the F-14. From the side, an
F-15. Its overall takeoff weight is similar to the F/A-18. So what?
People
trying to meet approximately the same requirements come to
approximately the same solutions. That’s physics, which is not colored
in red, white, and blue – or red.
Assuming we’re incorrect in these beliefs, why do you think Americans accuse the Soviets of stealing technology?
You
have achieved so much. Your country is a mighty world power. So you
tend to see everything as proof of your own achievements. You express
self-pride at the expense of self-criticism. Americans have always
underestimated the skills of foreigners – Asians, Europeans, everyone
else.
Is the MIG-29 a direct counter to the F-16?
Yes
and no. The concepts are close. The Soviet air force decided that it
would like to have a high/low mix of aircraft like the US Air Force.
The Su-27 and MIG-29 would act as the F-15 and F-16. In the design
stage, it became obvious that they wanted to mix these aircraft in a
ratio of two-to-one in favor of the MIG-29.
The MIG-29’s
major mission was to win close air combat with the F-16 and the F-15.
It was also designed to win BVR [beyond visual range] engagements with
the F-16 and to be more or less equal with the F-15. It had to be able
to shoot down any plane. It was not designed specifically to counter
the F-16.
Usually we evaluated the MIG-29 against the F-16
and the F-15, and sometimes against the F/A-18. We didn’t use the
Mirage 2000 in this comparison because we understood the Mirage 2000 to
be inferior to the American aircraft. If we can cope with the American
fighters, we can handle the Mirage 2000.
Was there any competition between the Mikoyan and Sukhoi designs?
We
did not have the competition as you had, for example, on your Advanced
Tactical Fighter. That is, two prototypes competing for the same
requirements. The aircraft were developed for two different
specifications. But we did compete for the scale of the production. And
we determined who had the better weapon control system, the better
weapon integration, etc. At one point in the development phase, in
1983, the two bureaus thought about competing the aircraft in a series
of simulated aerial encounters. That never happened.
But the
real competition was for the resources to produce a particular
aircraft. The Su-27, by the way, won. The Su-27’s production line is
still open. The MIG-29’s is not. One of my last efforts for the MIG
bureau was to convince my government that it is not smart to rely on
just one type of tactical aircraft.
Does the openness of the American system ever work to its disadvantage?
No.
And I know where this question leads. There is so much talking and
writing about Russians implementing other countries’ achievements into
our weapon systems. This was done but to about one-tenth the level that
most Americans probably suspect. I’d like to quote chief designer of
the MIG-29 and a man for whom I worked for many years Mikhail
Waldenberg. He said “Seeing how your neighbor plows his field does not
prevent you from pouring your sweat when you plow your own field.”
There
was much speculation that the MIG-29’s radar was a copy of the Hughes’
APO-65 on the F/A-18. I swear this was not the case. The radars first
of all are completely different. Russian radar designers went through
their own paces to get what they got. We did acquire the APO-65 but it
was too late in our design process to use it.
When an
air-to-air missile was chosen for the MIG-29 in the early 1970s we had
access to an AIM-7 Sparrow from North Vietnam. The missile was closely
inspected and evaluated. We decided that it was not any better than our
own R-27 missile [NATO-designated AA-10 Alamo] which was being
developed for the MIG-29. The Sparrow was put on the shelf and
forgotten.
The perception that we copied everything we could
is not true. In fact I cannot think of one system in the MIG-29 that
was copied from an American system. We went our own way and made our
own mistakes. We tried of course to use foreign information to develop
our system better. The MIG-29 and Su-27 have an infrared search and
track and a laser rangefinder. There is no such system on the
equivalent American fighters.
The MIG-31 had the first
airborne phased-array radar with electronic scanning. The system
permits you to throw the radar beam from one sector to another without
having to mechanically move an antenna dish. Until your Advanced
Tactical Fighter, not a single American fighter had an active
phased-array radar with electronic scanning. Your first airborne
electronic scanning radar, the APQ-164, was on the B-1B. It appeared
about two or three years after the MIG-31 radar.
In his recent book, Fulcrum,
Alexander Zuyev, a top MIG-29 pilot who defected to the West,
documented that an American spy working at a Russian radar design and
manufacturing bureau for many years gave away Russian secrets to
America. I have not come across one mention of the possibility of
Americans copying Russian radar technology even though the
circumstances and timing seem to support this.
But I don’t
believe that your APQ-164 was a copy of ours. People on both sides of
the Atlantic work on common problems and come up with similar solutions.
When
we first came to America with the MIG-29 in 1990, I kept hearing and
reading that we copied the F-14 because Our aircraft looks like the
F-14. They also said that we copied the F-18 because the MIG-29 looks
like the F-18. Well, it’s true that all three aircraft have two fins
and two engines.
Fortunately, the F-16 has a single engine
and one fin, so I haven’t noticed anyone saying that we copied the
F-16. But the F-15, F-14, and F-18 have two engines and two fins, so we
copied each and all of them. I’ve read this in dozens of publications.
Well, from the front, the MIG-29 resembles the F-14. From the side, an
F-15. Its overall takeoff weight is similar to the F/A-18. So what?
People
trying to meet approximately the same requirements come to
approximately the same solutions. That’s physics, which is not colored
in red, white, and blue – or red.
Most of the design
bureaus and manufacturing facilities are in the Russian republic, but
many former USSR aircraft are spread around the former Soviet Union.
How are Russia and the other republics dealing with these military
assets?
There are several groups of republics. The
Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – regained their
independence even before the Soviet Union collapsed. They have demanded
the withdrawal of Russian troops and the Russian air force units based
there. They have made no claims on the military equipment based in
their territory.
Moldova, which is ethnically Romanian, will
someday join Romania. But Moldova’s Slavic population is against the
move, so they fight with the ethnic-Romanians. Luckily, this conflict
has subsided. Moldova has one air wing of thirty-four MIG-29s and only
four pilots of Moldovian descent. They have used these planes in
bombing raids on Slavic areas. Moldova announced that it would like to
exchange these MIG-29s for helicopters, which would be more useful in
fighting the Slavic separatists.
The air force units based
in the Muslim republics of central Asia – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan – are still under the control of
the Russian air force. It appears that these republics are trying to
make an agreement with the Russian air force to obtain jurisdiction
over these units. But these units have ethnic-Russian pilots, who would
not want to stay in these republics after such an agreement because
their governments will likely shift towards Muslim fundamentalism.
The
Trans-caucasian republics – Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia – fight
each other. No one understands what is going on there. Georgia has
production facilities for the Su-25, and it has already used this
aircraft against its peasant separatists.
Belarus reached an
agreement with Russia last summer. These two republics are not arguing
over who owns what. But Russia still has troops under its jurisdiction
in Belarus territory.
Assuming we’re incorrect in these beliefs, why do you think Americans accuse the Soviets of stealing technology?
You
have achieved so much. Your country is a mighty world power. So you
tend to see everything as proof of your own achievements. You express
self-pride at the expense of self-criticism. Americans have always
underestimated the skills of foreigners – Asians, Europeans, everyone
else.
Is the MIG-29 a direct counter to the F-16?
Yes
and no. The concepts are close. The Soviet air force decided that it
would like to have a high/low mix of aircraft like the US Air Force.
The Su-27 and MIG-29 would act as the F-15 and F-16. In the design
stage, it became obvious that they wanted to mix these aircraft in a
ratio of two-to-one in favor of the MIG-29.
The MIG-29’s
major mission was to win close air combat with the F-16 and the F-15.
It was also designed to win BVR [beyond visual range] engagements with
the F-16 and to be more or less equal with the F-15. It had to be able
to shoot down any plane. It was not designed specifically to counter
the F-16.
Usually we evaluated the MIG-29 against the F-16
and the F-15, and sometimes against the F/A-18. We didn’t use the
Mirage 2000 in this comparison because we understood the Mirage 2000 to
be inferior to the American aircraft. If we can cope with the American
fighters, we can handle the Mirage 2000.
Was there any competition between the Mikoyan and Sukhoi designs?
We
did not have the competition as you had, for example, on your Advanced
Tactical Fighter. That is, two prototypes competing for the same
requirements. The aircraft were developed for two different
specifications. But we did compete for the scale of the production. And
we determined who had the better weapon control system, the better
weapon integration, etc. At one point in the development phase, in
1983, the two bureaus thought about competing the aircraft in a series
of simulated aerial encounters. That never happened.
But the
real competition was for the resources to produce a particular
aircraft. The Su-27, by the way, won. The Su-27’s production line is
still open. The MIG-29’s is not. One of my last efforts for the MIG
bureau was to convince my government that it is not smart to rely on
just one type of tactical aircraft.
What happened to the concept for a high/low mix?
Even
before the latest defense cuts, the Soviet air force decided to choose
just one of the types. The high/low concept was abandoned. They said
that the Su-27 can do anything that the MIG-29 can do. So they
terminated the production of the MIG-29. [Ed. Note: Over 800 MIG-29s have been built.]
Was the Sukhoi design the better choice?
Those
who made the decision did not consider fuel costs, which was nothing
back then. But now we’re experiencing severe fuel shortages for
operational squadrons. Air wings with MIG-29s have more fuel because
they get more flight time per gallon of fuel. The Su-27 is much bigger
and heavier.
Another thing, the difference in cost as
calculated by Russian “economists” was only some seventeen to twenty
percent higher for the Su-27. This cannot be true because the Su-27 is
almost twice as heavy as the MIG-29. As a general rule in comparing
aircraft, cost is associated with takeoff weight, unless you pour lead
into your aircraft, which no one does.
At the time, nobody
questioned these figures. Our accounting methods were primitive. You
could calculate the cost of an aircraft by sitting in your chair and
looking up at the ceiling. Nobody really cared about cost. The state
just needed a certain number of aircraft. When the air force was later
confronted with the necessity of making decisions based on cost
effectiveness, they did not have the necessary knowledge or skills. Any
efforts to convince them of how economic analysis was done in the West
went ignored until the mid-80s when Gorbachev came into power with some
partial economic reforms. Self-accounting was then applied to all
industries, including defense.
Now when they count fuel,
maintenance, and production cost, the analysts realize that the Su-27
is much more expensive. I would not be surprised if the MIG-29 is put
back into production because it is the cheaper solution and it can cope
with seventy or eighty percent of all of the missions for tactical
aviation.
You seem to be assuming that overall cost is a
determining factor for aircraft design in the West. Given the cost of
some of our more recent designs, do you believe that this is an
accurate assumption?
When I compare our experience
with yours, I almost always have in mind the F-16 program. It was for
me an example to follow not only as an aircraft but also as an approach
to an aircraft. It is a success in many terms.
Are Russian designs for advanced aircraft incorporating more low-observable technologies?
Low-observable
technologies were incorporated in the MIG design for an Advanced
Tactical Fighter. However the bureau’s overall approach to stealth was
less optimistic than it is in the United States. Well, of course, the
F-117 is an excellent aircraft. Lockheed built about sixty of them. But
you cannot win a war with sixty F-117s or with twenty B-2s. The F-22
appears to be a good compromise between flight performance and stealth
technology. These aircraft are great for demonstrating your
technological superiority.
Americans tend to accept stealth
as some evolutionary step in aircraft development, as the step from the
piston engine to the jet engine. I don’t see it that way. Stealth is
important, but in line with five or six others like integration of
electronic systems, electronic countermeasures, and
counter-countermeasures. The incorporation of low-observable
technologies is more comparable to the appearance of look-down,
shoot-down doppler radars. Cost factors are much more relevant. So is
maintainability. But these are dull attributes. You won’t sell any
color picture books on maintainability.
If the former Soviet
Union is drifting towards a situation similar to Yugoslavia, the
conflict will be between Ukraine and Russia. All these other conflicts
are small in comparison. Ukraine is self-sufficient and has enough
natural resources to do without Russia. Because Ukraine is on the
western part of the former Soviet Union, many of our elite operational
units fell into its jurisdiction when the union dissolved. Ukraine now
has an air force with more combat aircraft than France and Britain
combined, about 220 Su-24 Fencer penetration bombers, 120 MIG-29s, and
ninety Su-27s. Ukraine also has some strategic bombers. In all, about
2,000 combat aircraft. The negotiations over these aircraft are made
difficult by arguments over control of the Black Sea fleet.
Unlike
the Muslim republics, Ukraine proclaimed jurisdiction over all military
units in its territory. They asked ethnic-Russian pilots based there to
take a loyalty oath to the Ukrainian republic. Most returned to Russia
instead. But Ukraine did not let them take their planes. Now no one
there can maintain all the aircraft, so many are sitting outside
deteriorating. For example, eighteen of the thirty total Tu-160
Blackjack bombers were abandoned by their pilots and ground crews who
refused to take a military oath.
Military production
facilities in the former Soviet Union also produced consumer goods.
Does this experience make full conversion to consumer production any
easier or more likely?
About one-fourth of the output
from military-industrial facilities is now for military products. But
the reduction in military output is not being offset by any expansion
in the production of consumer goods. Military output is just going down.
Our
factories are good at producing many copies of a single type of
product. Such a system can’t cope with the fast-changing whims of the
marketplace. A centralized system does not react well to consumer
demand.
Are these production facilities trying to convert?
The
managers of these plants and design bureaus are pretending to convert
their production facilities to consumer goods in an attempt to retain
control of these particular industries and to obtain bank loans and
additional resources. Bankruptcy is not an option, because it will,
they argue, ruin the entire economy. I think non-effective enterprises
should go bankrupt. Let these managers become owners and give them a
right to the profits. But let them have the right to go bankrupt as
well.
What types of projects would you be pursuing if you were now in charge of one of the design bureaus?
General
aviation. Light-utility aircraft for use mainly within Russia. By the
virtue of its vast territory and under-developed road network, I think
general aviation has very good prospects.
What are the prospects for success of cooperative programs in Russia?
Some
will succeed and are succeeding. For example, Boeing is using TsAGI
wind tunnels and researchers for their development of new commercial
transport aircraft. Russia can offer the West a skilled labor force of
designers, researchers, and workers. And the labor cost in Russia is a
fraction of what it is here. We also have some unique testing
capabilities at our research facilities.
Will Russia itself pursue commercial aviation projects?
Commercial
projects for years received less attention in Russia. They were
second-level projects. But some projects could still be successful.
A
Tu-204, roughly equivalent to a Boeing 767, powered by Rolls Royce
engines is now flying. An Ilyushin Il-96M powered by Pratt &
Whitney engines will fly for the first time in March 1993. Both of
these aircraft are equipped with Western avionics, but their airframes
are manufactured in Russia.
What about military exports and cooperative programs?
Almost
forty countries fly the MIG-21. Mikoyan has proposed upgrading these
aircraft with a new Isotov RD-33 engine and with new avionics. I think
a proposal to install Western avionics in the MIG-21 could be even more
attractive. Hungarian MIG-21s are already equipped with British
radar-warning receivers.
News reports give the impression
that anything and everything in the former Soviet Union can be bought
for hard currency. Is this true for military hardware?
Any
government can buy any aircraft. We have a special commission that, in
theory, limits arms sales. No regime can buy nuclear weapons, but
anything can be stolen.
Many people pretend that they can
sell a MIG-29. The only entity that has an official right to sell these
planes is the Moscow Dyemyentyev Production Plant. But I’ve learned of
two MIG-29s in private possession in the United States. I don’t know
where these aircraft came from. They could be from a foreign air force
or from Ukraine, which is known to offer arms sales abroad through
third-party deals.
Unfortunately, we have a free market
economy without the controls you enjoy in the West. Before, we had a
communist ideology governing a communist economic system. Now we have
neither. We have a free market economy without an ideology. We have no
commonly accepted rules or ethics for behavior in business. That is one
of our biggest problems.
How can this problem be addressed?
I’m
not sure. It is usually addressed with moral tenets based in religion.
Believers and nonbelievers alike should automatically act according to
certain basic principles. When religion in our country was outlawed,
the habit of promoting commonly accepted ethical and moral behavior was
wiped out as well. Stalin didn’t execute 20 or 30 million people by
himself. Thousands, whose morals were not very high, participated. And
their survival has a lasting effect.